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COMMENTS
ANOTHER VIEW ON THE ORIGIN OF DEALER PARTICIPATION
IN AUTOMOBILE FINANCE CHARGES
RUSSELL HARDY*
A note in the Indiana Law Journal relative to automobile dealers'
participation in installment sales financing charges, in which valuable and
interesting material on the subject is collected, contains one very im-
portant statement which can be challenged in the light of other sources.'
The statement is:
The Big Three has been instrumental in disinfecting the
entire industry of many abusive practices. Partially because of
the nationals, the average finance charge has been maintained
at a reasonable level.
The truth is, those companies have the largest part of the responsibility,
probably the entire responsibility, for so "infecting" the business. They,
and they alone, aside from public officials, possess the means of effec-
tually "disinfecting" the business.
General Motors Acceptance Corporation originated the practice of
adding to the finance charge a part to be collected from the purchaser
and paid to the dealer.' Although the company began business on January
24, 1919, it was not until about the middle of 1925 that the dealer'partici-
pation practice was put into effect. During the first five or six years of
the GMAC existence, the methods used by it for the acquisition of
wholesale financing of General Motors dealers, and of the notes which
the dealers had taken from retail purchasers, included no effort, or at
least no systematic and appreciable effort, to force the dealers to patronize
GMAC. In that period the notes taken by dealers in retail transactions
were simple promissory notes, in a principal amount equal to the balance
due by the purchaser, bearing a percentage rate of interest. Generally,
the dealers retained the notes or transferred them variously to GMAC,
other finance companies, or banks, according to their own interests. The
principal advantage to the dealer of the transfers was the conversion of
his notes into cash, in effect making the sales of his cars cash transactions.
Profit to the dealers in the sale of notes was not expected and was virtually
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1. Is Control of Dealer Participation a Necessary Adjunct to Regulation of In-
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non-existent. The profit to GMAC and other finance companies during
these first years was represented by the interest paid by the note makers.
The volume of the GMAC wholesale and retail business increased from
1919 to the end of 1925 at a uniformly gradual rate-from about
$1,760,000 at the end of 1919 to about $246,113,000 at the end of 1925.'
Sales of General Motors cars fluctuated during the same period, indicat-
ing the absence of any strong influence connecting the volume of GM
sales with the volume of GMAC business.5
By 1925 it was clear that much of the GM dealers' financing business
was getting away from GMAC.6 In equal competition against independ-
ent finance companies and others, GMAC had proven incapable of at-
tracting all of the General Motors trade. The GMAC officials felt that
it was a melancholy hardship that up to that time "we had to fight our own
way" against the small and scattered competitors who were taking the
business away from the young but ineffectual financing giant.7 In this
emergency GMAC called upon General Motors to help them stay in
business.
An early, official "Confidential Report" of GMAC declared that
the purpose for which it had been organized was to acquire and keep
within its control, to the greatest extent possible, the business of financing
the sales of General Motors cars.' Results of the first seven years, how-
ever, convinced the GMAC management that the business acquisition
methods then being used were not effective to secure the business to the
"greatest extent possible."
Two new methods to accomplish the purpose were, accordingly, in-
augurated in the latter part of 1925: namely, dealer profit participation
in the finance charge, and exercise of control by General Motors of the
wholesale and retail financing part of the dealers' business.' In another
"Confidential Report," GMAC declared on December 3, 1925, "[t]he
factory will hereafter exercise control of the dealer's time selling prac-
tices," and "[tlhis corporation . . . will work hand in hand with the
factory divisions in the development of the dealer's credit merchandizing
along sound lines.'"1"
4. MOODY'S MANUAL OF INVESTIMENTS 2415, 2417 (1927) ; MOODY'S MANUAL OF IN-
VESTMENTS 1099 (1926); MooDY'S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS 2012 (1924).
5. Ibid.
6. United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 392 (7th Cir. 1941).
7. Id. at 392-393.
8. Id. at 382; Transcript of Record on Appeal, pp. 2636, 3072.
9. "GMAC finances approximately 65% of the General Motors cars sold to dealers
on time and around 75% of the cars sold to retail purchasers on time.". United States v.
General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 391 (7th Cir. 1941).
10. Ibid., Transcript of Record on Appeal, pp. 3141-3146.
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The effect of the new acquisition methods was powerful and in-
stantaneous. In 1926 the GMAC business rose at the stupendous ratio of
245 percent. Whereas its business for the whole preceding seven years
amounted to about $968,000,000, it amounted to about $607,000,000 in
1926.11 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals said the GMAC volume
of business and net earnings for 1926 increased about 225 percent over
1925.12 The increase was almost five times greater than the General
Motors sales increase of about forty-eight percent for the same period."
At the same instant, the dealer participating practice was permanently
fastened to a large part of the automobile business (the GM proportion
of the business was about forty percent at that time), and at the expense
of the retail time purchasers of GM cars.
GM and GMAC gave the dealer participation the euphemistic label
of "repossession loss reserve," on the pretense that it served solely to
compensate the dealers for losses on defaulted finance notes.14 In 1933
Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., then president of General Motors, candidly stated
that any "appreciable excess" over actual repossession losses was "unfair"
to other finance companies. 5 Sloan's candor was probably caused by a
lack of knowledge that his own companies were the worst offenders. It
is notoriously known that from 1926 to the present time, repossession
losses have amounted to but a small fraction of one percent (in bad times
a little more), while the payments to dealers have been enormously dis-
proportionate to the default and repossession deficiencies.
Not only is the "reserve" intrinsically a powerful business acquisi-
tion method, but the GMAC ingenuity soon devised a special manipula-
tion which multiplied its intrinsic force. This device is to remit no reserve
payments to dealers as individual installments are paid or as individual
notes are fully satisfied but to credit and accumulate the amounts for
periodic distribution. The funds thus due to dealers were held virtually
as bond money posted to assure dealer obedience to the GM-GMAC
financing law.1
The enormous and sudden increase of the GMAC business meant
an abrupt and almost complete disappearance of the business of independ-
ent finance companies who had been serving the GM dealers. They were
confronted with the choice between bidding a fond and permanent fare-
11. See note 4 supra.
12. United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 397 (7th Cir. 1941).
13. See note 4 supra.
14. Ibid. Also see generally NRA records and hearings on proposed automobile
finance code, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
15. NRA records and hearings on proposed automobile finance code.
16. For illustrative examples see United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376,
395, 396 (7th Cir. 1941).
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well to that important body of customers or recovering the business by
matching or increasing the participation offered by GMAC. They chose
to contend with the GMAC giant and adopt their dealer participation
acquisition practice. But it was not sufficient for the independents merely
to offset the participation accorded dealers by GMAC. Dealers de-
manded more from the independents to compensate them for resisting
the efforts to confine their patronage to GMAC. As the economic life
or death of a dealer depends on the pleasure and will of General Motors,
only a substantial additional amount would induce him to transfer his
time sales notes to an independent company.
The original exposure of GMAC during 1919-1925 to free enter-
prise competitive conditions-the same conditions under which independ-
ent finance companies have had to live and survive-was the first real
competitive experience of GMAC, and it has not been repeated since
GMAC grasped the GM apron strings, which GMAC has ever since
firmly held. Its most vigorous business acquisition effort has been to
receive, almost automatically, the enormous amount of business driven
into its waiting net by the GM power and influence.
Knowledge of the invention and stupendous effect of the new busi-
ness acquisition methods used by GM and GMAC, spread at once
throughout the automobile business. Chrysler and Commercial Credit
immediately formed an affiliation to use similar methods for procure-
ment of the Chrysler dealer financing by Commercial Credit, and Com-
mercial Credit began making substantial payments to Chrysler for "caus-
ing" its dealers to confine their financing patronage to Commercial
Credit.1" Ford and Universal Credit, then already affiliated by stock
ownership, also promptly applied the participation-coercion technique to
the time sales financing of Ford cars.'" The Commercial Credit-Chrysler
arrangement for payments to Chrysler added to the dealer participation
the practice of splitting the charge with the dealers' master as well. 9 The
corporate ownership by General Motors of GMAC gave GM a similar
interest in the finance charges collected by GMAC. As Ford and Chrys-
ler represented about fifty percent of the automobile business, the in-
dependent finance companies were again confronted with the choice of
abandoning a large part of their business or of matching the Ford and
Chrysler dealer participation and coercion. Thus the acquisition methods
were originated and permanently fastened upon ninety percent of the auto-
17. United States v. Chrysler, Crim. No. 1041, N.D. Ind., May 27, 1938; Civil No. 9,
November 7, 1938; THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 179, 186 (CCH 1952).
18. United States v. Ford, Crim. No. 1041, N.D. Ind., May 27, 1938; Civil No. 8,
November 7, 1938; THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 179, 187 (CCH 1952).
19. MOODY'S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS 775 (1928).
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mobile business by the Big Three companies. Whether those methods are
pernicious or wholesome, the credit or blame for their invention and use
belongs almost wholly to those companies.
The Big Three have sought to control and limit the dealer participa-
tion but, it seems, only when practiced by the independent finance com-
panies.2 ' By a variety of methods, they have sought to prevent dealers
from yielding to the competitive bidding of the independents against the
favored finance companies, such as threatening to cancel their contracts
for a supply of cars and so forth. In the case of General Motors and
GMAC, the factory affiliation with the finance company is obviously the
major cause and motive for coercion of dealers as to financing. It
would seem logical that disaffiliation would end the pressure on dealers.
Also the necessity would end for increasing the dealer participation in
an amount sufficient to pay him for the risk involved in displeasing GM.
Statements in the note to the effect that the Big Three finance com-
panies have maintained their finance charges at a low level and have al-
ways maintained lower rates than the independent finance companies2
are gravely misleading if not incorrect. The truth is that the associations
which have long existed between the Big Three factory and finance
companies and the manufacturers' performance of acquisition services
for the finance companies without cost make any invidious comparison
of independent finance rates meaningless to the public and unfair to the
independents. In the case of GM and GMAC, a high actual finance
cost to the purchaser can always be concealed behind a low finance rate
merely by placing in the basic cost of the car any amount of additional
finance revenue which may be desired, thus leaving the car buyer happy
in the illusion that he has paid a modest finance rate. As GM has always
owned all of the stock of GMAC, the finance corporation is in reality but
another cash register of General Motors. As a machine for acquiring
the financing business ostensibly at the lowest possible rates, the com-
bination of the two corporations could hardly be more perfect.
These acquisition methods have a two-fold effect which makes
comparison of rates unfair. First, they relieve the Big Three finance
companies of normal acquisition efforts and thereby reduce their acquisi-
tion cost; second, because it is necessary for independent companies not
only to make conventional acquisition efforts but also to make efforts to
offset the influence exerted against them in favor of the Big Three
companies, the acquisition cost of the independents is abnormally in-
20. United States v. Ford, 68 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ind. 1946), 335 U.S. 303 (1948);
Chrysler v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942) ; United States v. General Motors, 121
F.2d 376, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
21. Note, supra note 1, at 649, 656.
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creased. Moreover, no matter what may be the true significance of any
comparison of rates, it is unmistakably clear that the fact that the auto-
mobile finance business is ninety percent monopoly and ten percent free
competitive enterprise not only conceals the true financing cost but ab-
normally increases the total automobile financing bill for all time sales
purchasers as well. It follows that the position taken in the note that
the ownership of GMAC by General Motors has been an important factor
in reducing the finance charge to consumers22 is precisely the opposite of
the fact.
For the same reasons it appears further that the attitude in the note
that CIT, CC, and GMAC have caused the average finance charge to be
maintained at a reasonable level, " to say the least, takes in a lot of de-
batable territory. If the GMAC charges had been in fact maintained at
a "reasonable level," then GMAC profits would also stand at reasonable
levels, but, as the appellate court, speaking of the period, 1926-1938, said,
"The statistical data in the record indicates clearly that GMAC does
have a tremendous amount of business and makes huge profits."24
The idea that the GMAC competition against the independent com-
panies has been on the basis of rates, that GMAC has given the car pur-
chasers lower rates of its own, and that this has brought down the rates of
independents is contrary to the findings of the court of appeals. The
court held that GMAC had refused to adopt a recommendation of one of
its own principal officials to meet rate and nonrecourse competition of
independents and instead determined to maintain its rates and recourse
policy by the dealer's cut and by coercion of non-conforming dealers.25
The assertions in the note that Commercial Investment Trust, Com-
mercial Credit, and GMAC have been instrumental in "disinfecting" the
automobile finance business of many abusive practices" is merely a
resurrection of an argument made in the General Motors case to save the
monopoly-coercion system, which was thoroughly considered and fully
refuted in that case.2 The argument was the stock excuse of monopo-
lists,2" that is, that GMAC had been organized and had always existed,
not for profit, not for procuring the business of financing GM car pur-
chases to the largest extent possible, but solely for the public benefit. And
specifically it was urged that the aim of GMAC was to permit GM dealers
to patronize freely any independent finance companies, subject only to
22. Id. at 646.
23. Id. at 659.
24. United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 397 (7th Cir. 1941).
25. Id. at 391, 397.
26. Note, supra note 1, at 659.
27. United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 392, 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1941).
28. State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R.I. 254, 263, 70 Atl. 1, 5 (1908).
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the condition that the dealers receive from the independent companies no
part of the finance charge and make available to their customers the same
low rates and superior terms said to be offered by GMAC.2"
But the court found that the GMAC object and achievement was
profit and not to disinfect the business as to rates or practices, saying,
among other things,
The evidence shows that the coercive conduct in question
was not intended to discriminate against an inferior or unreliable
finance service. Rather its entire force and effect was directed
against any use of an independent finance service. Regardless
of the quality of the independent finance service, the command
to General Motors dealers was to use GMAC. And obedience
to the will of the appellants resulted in additional sales of the
finance service. But behind it all lay the might of GMC which
had achieved a dominant position in the automobile industry as
manufacturer of cars desired by dealer-purchasers and many
members of the retail public."
The basic cause of these conditions still exists, that is, the ownership of
GMAC by General Motors, and the other less durable associations which
are permitted to exist between the other large manufacturers and finance
companies.
The Government filed an antitrust suit to end the GM-GMAC
affiliation, based on the theory that the relationship produced an unlawful
monopoly of the financing business.3 The complaint charged that the
power of those great companies had been exercised to create unlawful
conditions, which could be corrected only by ending control of the finance
company by General Motors. Although this case afforded an intelligent,
effective remedy, it was hurriedly terminated, after many years of in-
action by the Government, in the last months of the preceding national
administration. A consent decree was quietly and jointly composed by
General Motors and Government officials, in which the government en-
tirely waived its demand for divorcement and the injunction of many
coercive practices. The Government representatives freely admitted the
inadequacy of the judgment to end the unlawful conditions but justified
their action on the feeble and incredible ground that the suit was aban-
doned "to avoid the expense of a trial of the issues and the loss of time
occasioned thereby." 2
29. United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 400, 406-407 (7th Cir. 1941).
30. Id. at 400.
31. United States v. General Motors, Docket No. 2177, N.D. III., October 4, 1940.
32. United States v. General Motors, Docket No. 2177, N.D. II., June 17, 1952, pro-
ceedings on entry of judgment.
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The factory coercion of dealers in financing transactions, which in-
evitably increases finance charges, is but one aspect of comprehensive
merchandising plans devised and enforced for many years by each of the
Big Three. These plans differ in minor features but are alike in being
based on the philosophy-not literally stated, of course, but implicit in
the principles-that all of the business in and incident to the sale, repair,
maintenance, and use of the cars, from the assembly line to the jalopy
graveyard, belongs to them. In the General Motors case, GM and GMAC
pressed the same view upon the court in the contention that the "com-
merce" in cars made by General Motors belonged to them, but the court
said that when the dealers bought the cars it became the dealers' com-
merce." Although the cars are invariably sold to the dealers only for full
cash payment at the factory and before delivery, and although title, owner-
ship, and possession is thus passed to new owners, these merchandising
plans enable a systematic invasion of the rights of the new owners in the
cars, which is at variance with our private property, free enterprise
economy. Among other things, dealers are limited by the factory as to
the prices and conditions on which the cars they own may be resold, and
as to purchases, contractual and business relations with other people,
principally competitors of the factory and its finance company. In a
recent striking example of this false theory of perpetual ownership, the
leading officials of General Motors and Ford condemned as "boot-
legging," the perfectly legal and necessary action of dealers in trans-
ferring cars which had been loaded on them in great numbers by the big
companies despite adverse selling conditions. These merchandising
methods constitute a system of control and regulation of numerous small
private businesses on a nationwide scale, which would be far in excess
of the constitutional powers of the Government itself and which, if ap-
plied to the big automobile companies, would be rightfully resisted by
them with rebellious indignation.
Those concerned about abuses in automobile financing, especially in
dealers' participation, should turn their serious attention to those coercive
merchandising schemes in their entirety. When these schemes receive
the sincere, effective attention of the public authorities, then the abuses
referred to in the Indiana Law Journal note will vanish.
33. United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 401, 402 (7th Cir. 1941).
